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July 15, 2005 
 
Overview 
 
1. Trade agreements have constitutional character - They shift decisions on preemption 
and takings to the international arena. 
 
2. The WTO's decision on gambling illustrates the threat to federalism. 
 
3. USTR's sovereignty statements are not attentive to state and local concerns.  
 
4. Congress can provide a forum for federal-state consultation on trade policy. 
 
1. Trade agreements have constitutional character The first director of the WTO 
described trade agreements as a constitution for the global economy. He accurately 
alludes to the constitutional function of limiting government authority. 
 
a. Before the WTO - Trade agreements primarily dealt with tariffs and government 
measures that discriminate against foreign goods at the border. 
 
b. With the WTO - Eighteen new agreements create trade rules that apply to laws that do 
not discriminate against foreign trade. Trade rules "prohibit" laws that are clearly 
constitutional and shift the balancing tests to determine whether a nondiscriminatory law 
is overly burdensome (compared to U.S. courts). The federal government has a legal 
obligation to enforce trade rules that apply to cities and states. One enforcement option is 
preemption: Congress adopted implementing legislation that authorizes the federal 
government to preempt state laws simply on grounds that they are "inconsistent with" a 
trade agreement.1 Other enforcement options include withholding of federal funds or 
non-approval of state plans. If the federal government does not enforce trade rules against 
states, other countries may apply economic sanctions against U.S. goods, services, or 
property rights. 
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c. Since the WTO - The United States has negotiated "WTO-plus" agreements such as 
CAFTA and other Free Trade Agreements, which have added controversial policies such 
as: 
 
(1) Foreign investor rights - in NAFTA, CAFTA and other Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs). Investment chapters empower foreign investors to seek compensation for 
expropriation when laws have a "significant" impact on their "expectations of profit." 
Investment agreements give greater rights to foreign investors - different procedures, a 
way to avoid U.S. courts, and a new book of legal rules like "expropriation" that will be 
defined by international tribunals. 
 
(2) Principles of pharmaceutical trade - in CAFTA and the Australia FTA (AUSFTA). 
These agreements convert existing patent law into a trade obligation, which means that 
Congress cannot amend patent law (e.g., to authorize import of FDA-approved drugs) 
without risking trade sanctions. The Australia FTA also obligates governments to 
subsidize "innovative" drugs without reference to the cost-effectiveness of those drugs, 
which all governments are working to attain. 
 
To summarize, WTO trade agreements and their cousins, the FTAs that are "WTO-plus," 
have constitutional character. They shift the preemption and takings debate from state 
capitols to Washington, and then from Washington to Geneva and other international 
fora. Rather that speak about abstract ideas in 18 different WTO agreements, I will focus 
on one agreement that likely has the greatest reach into the domain of state legislatures 
and city councils - the General Agreement on Trade in Services, the GATS. 
 
In May of this year the WTO decided a challenge by Antigua to U.S. laws that ban 
Internet or remote gambling and related laws in all 50 states. The United States avoided 
the brunt of this challenge (except for remote betting on horse racing) for two reasons. 
First, the WTO dismissed the claims against state laws because Antigua simply failed to 
brief the state issues. Second, the WTO ruled that violation of trade rules by the federal 
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ban on Internet gambling is excused by the "public morals" exception in the GATS. 
Nonetheless, this case provides substantial guidance on the meaning of trade rules that 
cover regulation of services. 
 
2. The WTO's decision on gambling illustrates the threat to federalism 
 
a. GATS covers all gambling laws - by mistake. GATS applies to sectors where countries 
make "specific commitments" to follow trade rules on Market Access and National 
Treatments. While accepting that the United States did not mean to, the WTO ruled that 
vague language in the U.S. schedule of commitments is a commitment on all gambling 
services - not just Internet gambling. Other sectors where the United States has 
commitments include financial services, health facilities, business and professional 
services, and services incidental to distribution of energy. 
 
b. GATS prohibits monopolies and prohibitions. Once a country schedules a 
commitment, the Market Access rule prohibits governments at all levels from operating 
monopolies or setting limits on the number of service providers or service operations, 
including quotas.5 The WTO ruled that any ban on Internet gambling is prohibited 
because it amounts to a "zero quota." In its briefs, the USTR warned the WTO that the 
"zero quota" interpretation would significantly limit the ability of governments to 
regulate certain sectors. 
 
c. Public morals exception. The USTR persuaded the WTO that the Market Access 
violation should be excused under the general exception for measures necessary to 
protect public morals. However, the threats posed by remote gambling (e.g., Internet 
access by children) cannot be used to justify economic monopolies like state lotteries or 
bans on casino gambling in Hawaii and Utah, particularly when neighboring states 
license many forms of gambling. 
 
d. Sanctions strategy. The USTR says that it will ask Congress to amend the Interstate 
Horse Racing Act to comply with the WTO decision. If Congress does not, Antigua is far 
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too small for punitive tariffs to work as a trade sanction. The academic literature strongly 
suggests that Antigua will follow Brazil's lead and withdraw trade commitments to honor 
U.S. intellectual property rights such as copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, 
patents and protection of undisclosed information. 
 
In response to these outcomes of the WTO Internet gambling case, the attorneys general 
from 29 states wrote the USTR on May 31, 2005: 
 
The prospect of [future] WTO challenges to [state-level gambling] prohibitions should 
alone be sufficient to give U.S. negotiators enormous motivation to use the current GATS 
negotiations to secure a rule change that makes explicit the right of a WTO signatory to 
ban undesirable activity in a GATS covered sector. 
 
3. USTR sovereignty assurances are not attentive to state and local concerns 
 
In May 2005, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) recently consulted with state 
officials with respect to the revised U.S. offer of trade commitments under the GATS. 
USTR provided the following assurances that GATS would not threaten state 
sovereignty. a. "Like any trade agreement, GATS simply says that if a state chooses to 
allow private competition in services, it should give U.S. and foreign firms a chance to 
compete on an equal footing." GATS is not like "any" trade agreement. It is unique in its 
application of Market Access rules that prohibit even nondiscriminatory quantitative 
limits. For example, in the U.S.- Internet Gambling case, the WTO's Appellate Body held 
that the Market Access rule prohibits a ban on domestically illegal trade (e.g., Internet 
gambling) because a ban is a "zero quota." In its brief, USTR stated that this 
interpretation would constrain government power to regulate in a nondiscriminatory 
manner. 
 
b. "Trade agreements such as the GATS do not automatically preempt, invalidate or 
overturn state laws." This is literally true, but only in the sense that the federal 
government must always ask a court to preempt state law. In other words, preemption is 
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never automatic, it is manual. The WTO implementing legislation specifically authorizes 
the Executive Branch to sue states in federal court to enforce the GATS, and sets the 
burden of proof to be that a state or local law "is inconsistent with the agreement in 
question." (emphasis added) The way in which preemption under trade agreements 
differs from domestic preemption is that Congress denied standing under a trade 
agreement to private parties. In addition to the threat of preemption, federal enforcement 
options include withholding federal funds, approval of state plans for spending federal 
funds, or other kinds of federal permission that a state may need. 
 
c. "Nothing in any trade agreement prevents the United States or any state from enacting, 
modifying, or fully enforcing domestic laws." Again, this is literally true. However: 
 
(1) It is also true that another country may challenge federal or state laws under GATS, 
and if successful, may impose trade sanctions in the form of punitive tariffs on U.S. 
goods or services that have nothing to do with the dispute. WTO sanctions have the 
economic effect of a secondary or tertiary boycott. These sanctions are designed to have 
the maximum deterrent effect. 
 
(2) It is also true that the federal government has a legal obligation under GATS to 
enforce U.S. trade commitments that apply to cities and states. 
 
d. "GATS does not require deregulation or privatization of any public service." Again, 
this is literally true in the sense that countries are free to not make GATS commitments, 
and the WTO has yet to implement the general GATS rules on domestic regulation. 
However, once the United States makes a commitment in a service sector (e.g., gambling 
or health facilities), GATS provides that the United States "shall not maintain or adopt" 
limits on the number of service suppliers, service operations, employees or types of legal 
entity. In domestic policy debates regarding electricity, health care or financial services, 
removal of these limits are typically described as "deregulation." 
 
4. Conclusion - Congress can provide a forum federal-state consultation on trade policy 
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Concerned that the WTO decision opens the door to future disputes, the USTR's advisory 
committee for state and local officials, IGPAC (the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory 
Committee), asked USTR to respond to a set of questions. These included whether the 
GATS commitment on gambling covers all gambling operations in the United States, 
including state monopolies, tribal gaming, casinos, racing, slot machines, etc. - all of 
which are regulated with limits on the number of service providers and service 
operations. IGPAC then asked about plans to withdraw the gambling commitment (before 
the gambling market grows exponentially). USTR's response was that: Since the 
Appellate Body rejected Antigua's challenge to state measures, the report provides no 
basis for reaching conclusions about how future hypothetical cases might affect state laws 
or regulations. 
 
IGPAC also asked whether CAFTA would open up broader risks of a challenge based on 
its services chapter or the rights of foreign investors to use a CAFTA country as a base to 
challenge federal or state laws. USTR's non-response to these questions indicates that 
federal-state consultations are not presently viable, at least as a public dialogue. The 
WTO gave ample basis for IGPAC's concerns, and IGPAC's suggestion of withdrawing 
the U.S. commitment is clearly an available option under WTO rules. IGPAC has 
proposed broader and deeper consultation on trade negotiations. As the IGPAC reports 
make clear, state and local governments support expanded trade. But they feel that with 
greater diligence and an open forum for consultation, the United States can have 
expanded trade while safeguarding its tradition of federalism. 
 
Thank you for holding this hearing and airing the need for broader and deeper 
consultations between U.S. trade negotiators and the state and local guardians of 
federalism. You have demonstrated that Congress can provide a forum to air the 
sovereignty debate that is so often overshadowed by the arguments over jobs and 
economic security. 
